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The government called these measures "calibrated and bounded." I would like to know what the calibration was, because the people who actually run cheating rackets are, right now, as you read this, using to access Telegram anyway.
The government's response to examination fraud is not to fix the examination.
Next time, if (and it is a "when," not an "if") papers surface on WhatsApp, do we ban WhatsApp?
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The NEET-UG 2026 re-examination is scheduled for June 21. Days before the exam, the Ministry of Electronics and IT invoked
But here is my question. You had a problem with a specific feature being misused in a specific way. The answer to that is: fix the feature. Telegram itself had already removed over 900 offending links and deployed AI tools to catch new ones. Instead of working with that, the government shut down the entire platform for 150 million people. That is like demolishing a shopping mall because someone shoplifted from one store.
The government called these measures “calibrated and bounded.” I would like to know what the calibration was, because the people who actually run cheating rackets are, right now, as you read this, using
“The ban has inconvenienced 150 million ordinary users while the cheating rackets, by definition technologically literate, may simply switch to another app. See the genius?”
Let me say this plainly. The fraud is not committed by Telegram. Telegram is just a pipe. The water (the leaked paper) enters the pipe from somewhere else. That somewhere else is the examination supply chain: the people who print the papers, the people who transport them in sealed packets to thousands of centres across the country, the invigilators who are sometimes complicit, the “strong rooms” that are sometimes not very strong. Those are human failures, institutional failures. You do not fix a leaking roof by banning buckets.
This is not the first time, either. Remember 2024? Paper leaks in Bihar and Gujarat. “Solver” networks charging lakhs per candidate. Arrests. Nationwide protests. The Supreme Court acknowledged malpractice but did not order a full re-test. And the NTA’s fundamental weaknesses — pen-and-paper testing, physical logistics chains with dozens of potential failure points, zero real-time verification — remained exactly as they were. Nothing structural changed. The building stayed the same. They just repainted the front door.
This is what worries me. We have now established a precedent. The government’s response to examination fraud is not to fix the examination. It is to ban whatever platform the fraud is allegedly distributed on. Follow that logic to its conclusion. Next time, if (and it is a “when,” not an “if”) papers surface on WhatsApp, do we ban WhatsApp? WhatsApp has over 500 million users in India. It is how people talk to their families, run their businesses, coordinate their lives. Are we prepared to shut that down too? And after WhatsApp, what? Signal? Email? SMS?
The absurdity becomes clear the moment you extend the principle one step further. And if a principle cannot survive one logical extension, it was never a principle. It was a panic response.
Here is what the Telegram ban really tells us, if we are willing to hear it. It tells us that the NTA cannot guarantee the security of its own examination. Because if it could, if the papers were genuinely secure, then a thousand Telegram channels claiming to sell “leaked” papers would be selling nothing but air. Students would laugh at them. There would be nothing real to buy. The government has already anounced to take help of the IAF for logistics to make sure no leakage …
The ban concedes that the system is penetrable. It is not a show of strength. It is an admission — officially stamped and gazetted — that our examination infrastructure is so fragile that it requires the pre-emptive shutdown of a major communication platform as a defensive measure. That is not security. That is insecurity, dressed up in the language of decisive action.
India tests more students through centralised high-stakes examinations than almost any country on earth. The futures of millions of young people depend on the integrity of those exams. The answer is not banning apps. The answer is building an examination system that does not need apps to be banned: computer-based adaptive testing, decentralised question generation, real-time biometric verification, and an infrastructure that is secure by design, not by censorship.
The government has already announced it will take the assistance of the Indian Air Force (IAF) for logistics to ensure no leaks occur. This raises a critical question that if, despite these extraordinary measures, a leak were to happen, would the authorities be prepared to hold the IAF accountable as well? This is absurd. But absurd actions begets absurd questions.
So, Banning the messenger quite literally is not a solution. It is a confession. And confessions, however well-packaged, do not produce doctors.
Disclaimer:The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of The Rift.



