The Watchdog Under Watch: Can India’s Election Commission Remain Institutionally Independent?

The SIR controversy: authority, procedure and the voter

The SIR of electoral rolls brought these questions into sharper focus. The exercise was challenged on grounds that included the ECI’s authority to conduct it, the documentation required, the risk of wrongful exclusion and compliance with the Representation of the People Act, 1950Representation of the People Act, 1950An Act of the Indian Parliament that deals with the preparation of electoral rolls and the delimitation of constituencies for elections to Parliament and state legislatures. and the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960Registration of Electors Rules, 1960Rules framed under the Representation of the People Act, 1950, that govern the procedure for registration of electors, including the forms and declarations required..

In Association for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of IndiaAssociation for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of IndiaA legal challenge brought before the Supreme Court of India, often concerning electoral processes, transparency, and the functioning of the Election Commission. The article refers to a specific case related to the SIR process., decided on 27 May 2026, the Supreme Court considered the legality and proportionality of the Bihar SIR and the Commission’s authority under Article 324. The judgment recognised the constitutional importance of accurate electoral rolls and upheld the Commission’s authority to conduct the exercise, while also addressing procedural safeguards and the legal treatment of persons affected by deletion.\[5\] It should not be read as blanket approval of every later administrative step, form modification or internal decision associated with subsequent phases of the SIR.

That distinction matters in relation to the reported dispute over Form 6, which is used by applicants seeking inclusion in the electoral roll. Reporting in September described objections to an additional declaration associated with the SIR, including whether a requirement affecting applicants could be introduced without amending the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960. The ECI subsequently stated that the SIR declaration would apply in the relevant SIR context while the prescribed form under the Rules would be used outside it. Other reporting said the declaration was withdrawn from the online Form 6 in certain circumstances following a full-Commission meeting.\[6\]

On 5 October, the Chief Justice of India was reported as clarifying that the Supreme Court had not approved a modified version of Form 6. The Court’s reported approach was to examine the relevant record rather than presume, on the basis of newspaper reports alone, that decisions had been taken unilaterally.\[7\] That is an important distinction. Judicial scrutiny of the decision-making process is not equivalent to a finding that the Commission acted unlawfully.

The controversy also concerns the allocation of authority inside a multi-member body. Section 18 of the 2023 Act provides that the Commission may, by unanimous decision, regulate the procedure for transacting its business and allocating business among its members. It further provides that business should, as far as possible, be transacted unanimously, and that differences of opinion are to be resolved by majority.\[8\] The provision makes collective decision-making a legal question, not merely an internal management preference.

The practical inquiry is therefore specific. Was a disputed step a decision reserved to the Commission, or an administrative implementation of an earlier decision? If it was a Commission decision, what record demonstrates compliance with Section 18? Did members have the opportunity to deliberate, and was any disagreement resolved through the statutory process? A written objection may indicate careful scrutiny. It may also point to a procedural problem. Its significance depends on the sequence of events and the underlying documents.

The ECI’s position, that differences expressed during deliberation do not necessarily negate a unanimous final decision, is plausible. collegial institutions should be able to debate proposals without every disagreement becoming a public crisis. But where objections allege that decisions were implemented without the knowledge of other members, the public interest is not served by relying only on general assurances. The appropriate response is to establish, from the official record, which decision was made, by whom, under what authority and through what process.

A further development illustrates why procedural safeguards must be considered from the voter’s perspective. On 9 October 2026, the ECI introduced limits on the number of Form 7Form 7The prescribed form used to object to the inclusion of a name in the electoral roll or to request the deletion of a name, often due to death, duplication, or ineligibility. objections an individual may submit seeking deletion of names from electoral rolls. According to contemporary reporting, the limits were up to ten during the claims-and-objections period and five per month during routine updating. The stated context was concern about bulk submissions and avoidable inconvenience. The effectiveness and legality of such safeguards should be assessed by reference to the governing Rules, the need to prevent misuse, and the ability of legitimate objections to be considered fairly.\[9\]

The underlying principle is not that every deletion is wrongful, or that every revision is suspect. Electoral rolls must be accurate. Duplicate, deceased or otherwise ineligible entries should be addressed according to law. But the scale of a revision cannot substitute for individual procedural fairness. The relevant questions are whether eligible electors receive appropriate notice, whether decisions are based on lawful criteria, and whether affected persons have accessible and timely avenues to challenge errors.

Independence with accountability: a reform agenda

The present controversy should not be used to presume wrongdoing, but it does expose areas in which institutional practice could be made more transparent. The following proposals are intended to improve verifiability while preserving the confidentiality necessary for candid internal deliberation.

First, the ECI should publish concise records of formal Commission decisions, identifying the legal authority relied upon, the date of decision and whether the outcome was unanimous or reached by majority. This need not require publication of every internal note or preliminary exchange. The objective is to make the final decision and its lawful basis auditable.

Second, recorded dissent should be treated as a normal feature of collegial decision-making. A short dissenting note, where a member chooses to publish one and disclosure is legally appropriate, can clarify the issue in dispute without converting disagreement into an allegation of institutional failure. Transparency should not require the release of every working paper. It should permit the public to understand how consequential decisions were authorised.

Third, the Commission should clarify which categories of decisions must be taken by the full Commission and which may be delegated to officials. The boundary is particularly important where administrative measures affect voter registration, access to electoral-roll data or the prescribed forms used by electors. Clear rules on delegation would reduce uncertainty and help distinguish routine implementation from decisions requiring collective approval.

Fourth, changes affecting the conditions or documentation for voter registration should be made through the legally prescribed route. Where legislation or rules govern a form or requirement, the Commission should identify the source of authority for any variation and explain whether formal amendment is required. This approach protects both legal certainty and the Commission itself. Decisions taken through the correct process are more defensible when challenged.

Fifth, the appointment framework should remain open to review. A selection process that includes meaningful participation beyond the incumbent executive may provide stronger assurance of independence. Any reform, however, should be assessed against constitutional text, institutional feasibility and comparative practice rather than the assumption that one committee design guarantees impartiality.

Finally, transparency must be matched by effective remedies for voters. Clear notices, accessible correction procedures, reasoned decisions where appropriate, and timely review are especially important during large-scale revisions. Institutional accountability is not only about how Commissioners relate to one another. It is also about whether citizens can understand and challenge decisions that affect their participation in elections.

Conclusion: independence must be demonstrable

The ECI’s independence has at least two dimensions. structural independence concerns the process through which Commissioners are selected and the safeguards against dependence. operational independence concerns how the Commission exercises its authority once constituted, including whether decisions are taken collectively and within the law. The 2023 appointment framework raises continuing questions about the first dimension. The reported SIR dispute has made the second dimension a matter of immediate public concern.

The Commission maintains that its decisions were unanimous and that internal differences were part of ordinary deliberation. Commissioners reportedly raised objections, and the courts have been asked to examine aspects of the process. Until the relevant records are assessed and the legal proceedings resolve the disputed issues, commentary should resist declaring a winner. It should instead insist on the standards that apply regardless of the outcome: statutory compliance, fair procedures, transparent reasons and effective remedies.

A constitutional watchdog does not preserve its independence by being insulated from every question. Nor does accountability require political control over its decisions. Properly understood, accountability for legality is one of the conditions of independence. An institution that can demonstrate that it acted through lawful authority and collective procedure is strengthened by scrutiny. One that cannot explain how consequential decisions were made risks losing the public confidence on which its constitutional role ultimately depends.